







How physics flew the philosophers’ nest 
 




Nowadays, physics and philosophy are housed in separate departments on uni-
versity campuses. They are distinct disciplines with their own journals and con-
ferences, and in general they are practiced by different people, using different 
tools and different methods. This was not always the case: up until the early 
17th century (at least), physics was a part of philosophy. So, what happened? 
And, what philosophical lessons should we take away? 
The standard story we tell ourselves is that this split took place during the 
17th century.1 As a vivid illustration, compare the fate of Descartes Principles of 
Philosophy with Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, pub-
lished less than 50 years apart, in 1644 and 1687, respectively. There is consid-
erable overlap in the two projects, and Newton’s book is helpfully read as re-
sponding in part to Descartes. Yet Descartes’ Principles is taught today in phi-
losophy departments, and we think of it as a text in the history of philosophy, 
whereas Newton’s Principia is not taught as a canonical text in philosophy, and 
is claimed by physicists for the history of physics. One explanation might be 
this: some time between the two, the “Scientific Revolution” took place, yield-
ing Newton’s Principia as its crowning achievement. In the process, physics 
achieved autonomy from philosophy, leaving Descartes’ Principles behind. Up-
shot: by the end of the 17th century, physics had flown the philosophers’ nest, 
and the 18th century saw physicists doing Kuhnian “normal science” and solv-
ing puzzles within the Newtonian paradigm. 
																																																						
1 The “standard story” as we rehearse it here has been challenged, revised, and rejected in var-
ious ways. See, for example, Pulte 1993 and Caparrini & Fraser 2013. These authors are histo-
rians of physics. See also Shank 2008. We offer a new way of thinking about the philosophical 




But this is not really how it happened. There is no doubt that important de-
velopments in natural philosophy took place in the 17th century, and that New-
ton’s Principia was enormously influential for the evolving relationship be-
tween physics and philosophy. Nevertheless, as of the early 18th century, the 
split between physics and philosophy had not yet taken place. Here, for exam-
ple, is leading natural philosopher Musschenbroek,2 writing in the 1720s and 
giving a nice taxonomy of philosophy in which physics is one part of philoso-
phy (we quote here from the later English translation): 
 
Philosophy is the knowledge of all things both divine and human, and of their 
properties, operations, causes, and effects; which may be known by the under-
standing, the senses, reason, or by any other way whatever… 
Philosophy is a very ample science, and therefore ought to be divided into cer-
tain parts, which we shall reduce to the six following… 
● Pneumatics “which comprehends whatever belongs to spiritual existences, 
their attributes and operations” 
● Physicks “which considers the space of the whole universe, and all bodies 
contained in it; enquires into their nature, attributes, properties, actions, 
passions, situation, order, powers, causes, effects, modes, magnitudes, or-
igins”  
● Teleology “which investigates the ends, for the sake of which all things in 
the universe have their existence, and all their actions, changes and mo-
tions are performed” 
● Metaphysics “which explains such general things as are in common to all 
created beings. As what is being, substance, mode, relation, possible, im-
possible, necessary, contingent, etc.” 
● Moral philosophy “gives us rules, by which we should direct all our ac-
tions” 
● Logick “which considers the intelligent and reasoning faculty of the human 
mind, and instructs us in the methods of reasoning justly, and of avoiding 
error…”  (Musschenbroek 1744: 1-2) 
 
For our purposes, the most important things to note are the inclusion of physics 
within philosophy, and the characterization of physics as encompassing “the 
																																																						
2 Musschenbroek was a highly renowned natural philosopher and experimentalist in the 18th 





space of the whole universe, and all bodies contained in it”, including their na-
ture, attributes, properties, powers, causes, etc. On this view, the primary sub-
ject-matter of physics is bodies, and the only features of bodies that do not fall 
within the purview of physics are those that belong to created beings in general, 
that is, to both bodily and spiritual beings; the study of these most general fea-
tures belongs to metaphysics. As a result, many aspects of bodies that we might 
think of today as being the subject of metaphysics, such as the nature, powers, 
causes, effects and origins of bodies, fall within physics.  
This conception of physics—or “natural philosophy,” as it was also 
known—was widely held at the time,3 and provides some initial evidence that 
physics was not yet an autonomous discipline. More evidence will be given as 
we proceed. If we want to see the split between physics and philosophy unfold, 
and to understand the philosophical reasons for it, then we have to look not only 
before the Principia, but after it too. 
Here is what we find. There is one particular problem, dating back to Des-
cartes and persisting long into the 18th century, that plays a pivotal role. The 
failure to solve it, despite repeated efforts, precipitates a profound change in the 
relationship between physics and philosophy. The culprit is the problem of col-
lisions. Innocuous though it may seem, this problem becomes the bellwether of 
deeper issues concerning the nature and properties of bodies in general. 
Namely, the ultimate failure of attempts to combine a matter theory with rules 
of motion into a complete account of collisions is symptomatic of a much 
broader failure throughout the century: the inability to integrate a philosophical 
physics of body with a mathematized mechanics in ways that produced stable 
agreement. The failure to successfully address the problem led to a reconcep-
tualization of the goals and subject-matter of physics, and to physics flying the 
philosophers’ nest. Or so we shall argue. 
 
2. Some 17th century background 
Three episodes from the 17th century provide the necessary background for un-
derstanding why collisions became such a serious problem in the 18th century. 
The first is the place of collisions in Descartes’s philosophy; the second is the 
investigations into rules of collision by the Royal Society of London in the 
1660s; and the third is Malebranche’s theory of collisions from the late 1600s, 
																																																						
3 See also, for example, Lemonnier 1750: 5; Hanov 1762: 13; Baumeister 1747: 10; Meier 1765: 




along with Leibniz’s critiques. Together, these set the scene for the events of the 
18th century. 
In his Principles of Philosophy, Descartes set out to explain all natural phe-
nomena by appeal to matter in motion. Descartes’s “metaphysical physics”4 be-
gins with his matter theory — an account of the nature of matter in terms of its 
essence, attributes and modes — and a definition of motion.5 All change comes 
about through collisions among the parts of matter, via the three laws of nature 
and the accompanying rules of collision. These rules of collision arise as a con-
sequence of the nature of matter, and they are necessary for the explanation of 
all natural phenomena. As a result, the rules of collision lie at the intersection 
of metaphysics, matter theory, and physics.6  
The foundational place of collisions in Descartes’ project means that find-
ing viable rules of collision becomes a foundational problem in natural philos-
ophy. Reasons for dissatisfaction with Descartes’s rules are not hard to find. On 
the one hand, it is not clear that the rules are consistent with his laws of nature, 
and even with one another.7 On the other, for those with any empiricist leanings, 
Descartes’s claim that his rules hold for the tiniest parts of matter even if not for 
the motions of observable bodies (1991, Part IV, paragraph 204), is not encour-
aging. In the mid 1660s, the Royal Society of London conducted some experi-
ments on collisions (Hall 1966). Henry Oldenburg,8 then Secretary of the Royal 
Society, wrote to Huygens and Wren asking for their theories of motion and 
collision, and by December 1668 the Royal Society had in hand information 
about rules of collision from Huygens, Wren and Wallis.9 In today’s terminol-
ogy, the rules of Huygens and Wren pertain to perfectly elastic collisions, while 
																																																						
4 The term comes from Garber 1992. 
5 See Descartes 1991, Part II, especially §4 and §25. For more on Descartes’s matter theory, and 
the theory of matter in the 17th century more generally, see Jalobeanu and Anstey 2011. 
6 There is a large and rich literature on science and philosophy in the 1600s that engages with 
many themes and issues from the broader historical context of the argument in this paper. We 
cannot revisit that here; our purpose in this section is to point narrowly to the 17th-century ep-
isodes that precipitate developments in the 1700s, which are our main concern throughout the 
paper. The episodes we highlight here dovetail nicely with Alan Chalmers’ studies of how mat-
ter theory and some parts of physics began to diverge, in the 17th century; cf. especially chapter 
6-7 of Chalmers 2009.  
7 A thorough discussion of how Descartes’ derived his rules, and whether they cohere with his 
laws, is the older Gabbey 1971; cf. Garber 1992 for additional explanation of Descartes’ third 
law of nature.  
8 Oldenburg maintained a high profile and a prolific correspondence across the learned world, 
which he made available through the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 
(Hall 2002). 




those of Wallis pertain to perfectly inelastic collisions. Since these rules are fa-
miliar from collision problems in classical mechanics today, one might think 
that with the Huygens, Wren and Wallis rules of collision in place, the issue of 
collisions was resolved. Not so. 
On December 1st, 1668, Oldenburg wrote to Wallis asking a range of ques-
tions, including:10 
• Whether springiness is the only cause of rebounding 
• Whether quiescent Matter has any resistance to motion 
• Whether motion may pass out of one subject into another 
• Whether no motion in the world perish, or new motion be generated 
• Whether different motions, meeting, destroy one another 
These questions concern the nature of matter, the properties of bodies, whether 
or not motion is conserved, and so forth. Notice that they do not pertain to 
whether or not the rules are correct; rather, they suggest that the rules by them-
selves are in some way incomplete or insufficient. Oldenburg put the point like 
this: 
 
the Society in their present disquisitions have rather an Eye to the Physical causes 
of Motion, & the Principles thereof, than the Mathematical Rules of it. 
 
The issues at stake are put rather nicely by William Neile, in a letter to Olden-
burg of 18 December 1668:11 
 
I wish Dr. Wren would explain his principles a little more fully but he is against 
finding a reason for the experiments of motion (for ought I see) and says that the 
appearances carrie reason enough in themselves as being the law of nature. I think 
it is the Law of nature that they should appear but not without some causes. … 
 
I think a body cant be made hard without motion in its particles that is with out a 
spring and the more motion it has the more spring it has… I think all bodies are 
like fire only a masse of particles variously moving and sometimes resting… 
																																																						
10 Cf. his letter in Oldenburg 1965–1986, 5: 220–222; for context and additional discussion, see 
Jalobeanu 2011.  
11 From Neile’s letter to Henry Oldenbourg of 18 December 1668, in Oldenbourg 1965-86: 263-
4. For the historical envelope and philosophical analysis, see Jalobeanu 2011: 114-20. Neile was 
an exceptional young mathematician and fellow of the Royal Society who unfortunately died 





Neile is seeking an explanation for the rules of collision in terms of an underly-
ing matter theory, just as we find in Descartes’ theory. As noted above, Des-
cartes’s rules arise from the nature of matter, and from his metaphysical system 
more generally, including considerations of God’s unchanging action in the 
world. Neile’s point is this: the rules do not stand on their own; they must be 
integrated into a theory of matter.12 
What this tells us is that, for some people at least, Descartes’ Principles left 
two unresolved issues associated with collisions. First, the rules of impact re-
quired correction, and this was satisfactorily done (for a restricted set of cases13) 
by Huygens, Wren and Wallis. Second, the corrected rules needed to be appro-
priately connected to matter theory. This is the problem of collisions. 
The problem persists through the remainder of the century. In 1675, Male-
branche published the first edition of his Search After Truth. In this text, he fol-
lowed Descartes’s model of associating rules of collision with a theory of mat-
ter. However, Malebranche diverged from Descartes: in his matter theory, he 
rejected Descartes’ “force of rest” along with his claim that hard bodies re-
bound; for his rules of collision, he replaced Descartes’ with those of Huygens, 
Wren and Wallis. Malebranche attempted to fit the two pieces together, but the 
upshot is not altogether satisfactory, and in 1678 Leibniz published his Brief 
Demonstration of a Notable Error, which is best understood as a critique of 
Malebranche’s theory of collisions.14 Leibniz argued that Malebranche’s rules 
make use of the wrong conserved quantity, famously arguing for conservation 
of vis viva instead,15 and that they violate his supposed “law of continuity”. 
																																																						
12 We use the term “matter theory” for the philosophy of matter, including questions concerning 
the nature of matter, its qualities (essential and otherwise), and its behavior. Matter theory had 
a central place in early modern philosophy, as exemplified by Descartes’s Principles of Philoso-
phy (see above), as well as Hobbes’ Leviathan, Boyle’s Forms and Qualities, Spinoza’s Ethics, 
Locke’s Essay, Berkeley’s Principles, Hume’s Enquiry, and so forth (see Jalobeanu and Anstey, 
2011: 1; and also Gaukroger 2006, Chapter 10).   
13 The rules of Huygens, Wren and Wallis pertain to collisions that are perfectly elastic and 
inelastic, occurring between perfectly spherical bodies of uniform mass distribution (noting 
that these rules were formulated prior to Newton’s development of his concept of mass), and 
for which the rotational motion of the bodies (as they roll towards one another) plays no role in 
the outcome of the collisions. 
14 For evidence Leibniz wrote Brevis demonstratio so as to object to Malebranche above all, see 
Robinet 2012.For analysis of the conceptual issues involved in their debate, cf. Brading and 
Stan, Philosophical Mechanics in the Age of Reason, ms. 
15 This is the origin of the so-called “vis viva controversy”, for more on which see Hankins 
(1965), Laudan (1968), Iltis (1970), Papineau (1977), Terrall (2004), Smith (2006), Reichen-




Malebranche’s main concerns lay far from collision theory; yet, in following 
Descartes, he placed collisions at the basis of his natural philosophy, and so deal 
with the problem he must. Perhaps reluctantly, he tweaked his rules for hard 
body collision, but Leibniz was not satisfied, issuing more critiques (1692, 1693, 
1698) and engaging in disputes with followers of Malebranche, until in 1700 
Malebranche offered a fully revised theory of collisions in the fifth edition of 
the Search After Truth.16 And with this, neatly for our story, we arrive at the 
opening of a new century. 
 
3. What’s the problem? 
A review of early 18th century natural philosophy sheds further light on the 
problem of collisions, and reveals it to have been of widespread concern, as we 
shall now see.  
Malebranche’s (1700) mature theory of collisions proceeds as follows. It be-
gins from the nature of matter as in itself soft, and from there constructs three 
kinds of bodies: soft, hard, and elastic. Soft bodies are regions of soft matter, 
relatively at rest with respect to one another. Hard bodies are also such regions, 
differing from soft bodies in that they are compressed by the surrounding subtle 
matter. Subtle matter is simply soft matter, moving at high speeds relative to the 
quiescent region of soft matter that it compresses into a hard body. Elastic bod-
ies too arise from soft matter, but in their case they contain pores, through which 
the subtle matter passes. These three kinds of body are distinguished from one 
another in collisions by their shape behavior: on impact, soft bodies undergo 
irreversible deformation, whereas hard bodies undergo no deformation at all. 
Elastic bodies undergo reversible deformation. What is to be explained, given 
these resources, is the kinematic behavior of these bodies in collision: elastic 
bodies rebound, whereas hard and soft bodies do not. Malebranche seeks to ex-
plain this, and thereby explain the rules of collision, by describing the process 
of collision in terms of his theory of matter. For example, in the case of elastic 
bodies, subtle matter is squeezed out of the pores of these bodies during the 
initial phase of the impact (so the body deforms and compresses), and rushes 
back in during the second stage (the body recovers its initial shape and re-
bounds).  
																																																						
16 See Brading and Stan, Philosophical Mechanics in the Age of Reason, ms., chapter 2, for the 




What we see here is Malebranche striving to provide an account of the col-
lision process that integrates the rules of collision into his matter theory. The 
intermediate step is his account of bodies. His theory of matter provides the 
resources for the construction of bodies: their nature and their properties. The 
rules of collision say how the motions of bodies are changed by mutual impact. 
An adequate theory of matter will provide bodies whose nature and properties 
are sufficient to explain the behaviors described by the rules of collision. In this 
way, the problem of collisions became a test of matter theory: any satisfactory 
matter theory had to be capable of yielding an account of bodies adequate for 
the explanation of collisions. As for Descartes, metaphysics, matter theory and 
physics are inextricably entwined. 
The integration of the rules of collision into a theory of matter is what any 
viable solution to the problem of collisions was expected to achieve. Despite 
his best efforts, Malebranche’s account was not accepted as a success. The 
problem remained unsolved, and was taken up by his followers and critics 
alike.17 
It was not just the “Cartesians,” such as Malebranche, who pursued this 
problem. We see self-proclaimed “Newtonians,” such as John Keill (1700) 
along with ’s Gravesande (1720), Musschenbroek (1744), Pemberton (1728), 
MacLaurin (1728) and so forth, undertake the same task, albeit with modifica-
tions reflecting the differing epistemologies and methodologies. Keill, for ex-
ample, divides bodies into three kinds (hard, soft and elastic) according to their 
material properties, and then seeks to combine this taxonomy with two sets of 
rules of collision (one for rebound and one without) via a causal explanation of 
how the material properties yield the collision outcomes for each kind. How-
ever, the relation between his three-way taxonomy and his quantitative dynam-
ical rules remains stipulative: Keill says that the former grounds the latter, but 
he is unable to derive the one from the other.18 
The same foundational concern—to integrate collision rules with a sound 
philosophy of body—animated the Germans. We have already seen that Leib-
niz took the problem of collisions very seriously, challenging Malebranche’s 
account, and a discussion of collisions is one strand running through The Leib-
niz-Clarke Correspondence of 1715-16. As early as 1669 Leibniz had expressed 
dissatisfaction that the Wallis-Huygens-Wren rules were left unexplained. “For 
[Leibniz] seems to think that neither you nor Mr. Wren have assigned the causes 
																																																						
17 See Brading and Stan Philosophical Mechanics in the Age of Reason ms. for more details. 




of these Phenomena that you examined in establishing your rules,” Oldenbourg 
told Huygens.19 Much of his later work in natural philosophy famously 
amounted to finding a doctrine of matter adequate for grounding the rules. He 
thought he found it in a conception of body qua essentially endowed with 
force—in particular, derivative forces, which “suffer modifications” in impact. 
The rules of collision spell out precisely that modification, under the general 
principle that overall force is conserved (in the system of interaction).  
Leibniz’s disciples continued this agenda. Jakob Hermann sought to con-
nect the collision rules with two kinds of force (responsible for elastic and ine-
lastic impact, respectively). Then Christian Wolff expanded the perspective, by 
integrating impact rules not just with matter theory, but with an ontology of 
body more generally.20 Just like Descartes, he kept collision at the heart of his 
natural philosophy: “no change can occur in bodies except by means of colli-
sion” (Wolff 1731: 244). And, he emphasized that ultimately metaphysical prin-
ciples are needed to ground the rules: “Implicit in the rules of motion are certain 
general principles, from which these rules can be derived. ... It is the business 
of Metaphysics to demonstrate those principles” (1731: 228). In sheer volume 
and detail, his account exceeded all other similar attempts in the early Enlight-
enment.21    
In sum, the Leibnizians likewise took up the post-Cartesian challenge. In 
every case, the goal was the same: to provide a causal-explanatory account of 
the collision process that integrates the rules of collision into a theory of matter. 
As of the early century, no proposal had met with general acceptance. 
As this brief overview indicates, the topic of collisions received widespread 
attention in the early 1700s. This is not surprising since, from Descartes on-
wards, collisions lay at the foundation of natural philosophy. This was true even 
for those Newtonians who, after Newton’s Principia, embraced action-at-a-dis-
tance in their treatments of gravitation, for they too retained collisions among 
																																																						
19 Oldenburg to Chr. Huygens, 7 April 1671, in Huygens (1897: 56).  
20 Hermann’s collision theory is in chapter VI of his Phoronomia (1716: 110-24). Christian Wolff 
took up the project in the 1720s, and completed it with an extensive account of collision, both 
elastic and inelastic, derived from his philosophical physics, in Cosmologia generalis (1731: §§ 
363-502).   
21 Later in the century, the young Kant would take up this foundational agenda, outlining his 
collision theory in a 1758 paper, “New Doctrine of Motion and Rest” (Kant 1912). He designed 
a theory of matter (or “physical monadology”, based on a species of mass points) and a causal 
dynamics of impact, from which he derived rules of inelastic collision. Like those before him, 
he regarded the rules as insufficient on their own, because they describe “only the outer phe-
nomenon of what occurred immediately between [the colliding bodies]; and it is the latter that 




bodies as one means of causal interaction. In short, everyone needed a theory of 
collisions. Moreover, there were widespread commonalities in the criteria for 
success. With all of this interest and effort, a solution might reasonably have 
been expected. Why, then, did the problem become acute? 
 
4. The problem becomes acute: three reasons 
Against this backdrop, we suggest three reasons why the problem of collisions 
became acute by the mid 18th century: intelligibility, intractability, and scope. 
To preview: (1) the very intelligibility of contact action was seriously chal-
lenged; (2) attempts to solve the problem of collisions, success at which might 
be expected to address the issue of intelligibility, proved unsuccessful; and (3) 
the treatment of collisions was not an issue local to physics but had ramifica-
tions across philosophy quite generally. 
Let’s begin with the first reason. Disputes over the intelligibility of action-
at-a distance placed action-through-collisions in the spotlight. The Leibniz-
Clarke Correspondence (Alexander 1956) opens with questions of God’s pres-
ence and action in the world, and quickly turns to the issue of how one body 
acts on another, both in collisions and also, more famously, in accordance with 
Newton’s theory of gravitation. Leibniz wrote: 
 
But then what does he mean, when he will have the sun to attract the globe of the 
earth through an empty space? Is it God himself that performs it? But this would 
be a miracle, if ever there was any. … 
… That means of communication (says he) is invisible, intangible, not mechanical. 
He might as well have added, inexplicable, unintelligible, precarious, groundless, 
and unexampled. 
… If the means, which causes an attraction properly so called, be constant, and at 
the same time inexplicable by the powers of creatures, and yet be true; it must be 
a perpetual miracle: and if it is not miraculous, it is false. ‘Tis a chimerical thing, a 
scholastic occult quality. (Alexander 1956: 94) 
 
In contrast with gravitation, Leibniz held contact action to be intelligible. Yet 
debates continued over how to theorize contact action, with the controversy 
over vis viva being the most famous strand of these debates. In the midst of all 
this, the onus falls on those wielding the weapon of intelligibility to show that 




What would this involve? The parallel with Newton’s theory of gravitation 
is instructive. Newton provided a mathematical rule for the behavior of bodies 
acting on one another via gravitation. The rules of collision can be thought of 
as analogous. Leibniz demanded that the rule for gravitation be rendered intel-
ligible in terms of an underlying theory of matter, one which showed how it is 
that one body acts on another such that the upshot is motion in accordance with 
the law of gravitation. The analogous demand is to provide an account of the 
collision process, in terms of an underlying theory of matter, that renders intel-
ligible how it is that one body acts on another such that the upshot is motions 
in accordance with the rules of collision. As we have seen, there was no gener-
ally accepted solution to this problem.  
The high profile disputes over the intelligibility of Newtonian gravitation 
raised the visibility of the problem of collisions. As we will see in more detail 
below, Maupertuis in 1732 argued that, qua form of action between bodies, 
contact action via a motive, or “impulsive,” force is no more intelligible than 
is Newtonian action-at-a-distance. Contact action seems intelligible only be-
cause it is familiarly common: we have often seen collisions among bodies, 
and so we are accustomed to it. This increased visibility contributed to the 
pressure on finding a solution.  
Had a solution been forthcoming, the intelligibility issue might have been 
resolved as part of that solution. However, the second reason why the problem 
of collisions became acute is decades of failure in attempting to solve it. Admis-
sion of failure was given institutional expression in France. In the 1720s—forty 
years after the Royal Society of London discussions of collisions—the Paris 
Academy of Sciences offered two prize competitions on the topic. The first, in 
1724, posed this question: “Which are the laws whereby a perfectly hard body 
in motion will move another body of the same nature through collision, be it in 
a vacuum or in a plenum?” The entries make clear that merely offering Wallis’s 
rules would be insufficient as an answer: a causal explanation of hard body col-
lisions was expected and required. Far from resolving the issue, the competition 
made the difficulties even more visible. Moreover, because Johann (I) Bernoulli 
sought to provide an account in terms of elastic bodies, the competition on hard 
body collisions highlighted the difficulties with elastic body collisions too. In 
1726, the competition was on “the laws of impact between bodies with recoil, 
perfect or imperfect, deduced from a probable explanation of the physical cause 
of recoil” (emphasis added). As this statement of the topic makes clear, the 
Academy sought an explanation of the rules of elastic collision in terms of un-




subtle matter. Indeed, the winning paper explained elastic compression, shape 
restoration, and rebound based on microscopic vortices of subtle matter, the ap-
proach that Malebranche had pioneered in 1700. And like Malebranche’s own 
theory, it failed to convince. We are now 80 years from Descartes’s Principles of 
Philosophy, and there is still no satisfactory account of collisions.22 
In our opinion, the high-profile dispute over the intelligibility of Newtonian 
gravitation along with the persistent failure to solve the problem of collisions 
worked together to make the problem acute. With this in mind, we can see Mau-
pertuis in 1732 challenging his fellow French philosophers head-on when he 
writes that the means by which bodies act on one another through the “impul-
sive force” of collision is no more intelligible than the attractive force of gravi-
tation: 
 
The common People are not at all surprized when they see a Body in motion com-
municate its Motion to others, for being used to this Sight they see nothing won-
derful in it: but Philosophers who are resolute enough to decide a priori concerning 
what Properties are to be admitted in Bodies, and what excluded; such Philoso-
phers I say cannot conceive the impulsive Force more conceivable than the attrac-
tive. What is this impulsive Force? How does it reside in Bodies? Who could have 
imagined it to have been resident therein, before he had seen the shock or congress 
[i.e. the collision] of Bodies? (Maupertuis 1734: 14) 
 
There are several targets in Maupertuis’ text, but for our purposes the important 
point is that he is seeking to put attraction and contact action on an equal epis-
temic footing, and he is doing so by pointing out the inadequacy of the existing 
causal-explanatory accounts of collisions.23 
If you have ever wondered why, in his discussion of causation, Hume seems 
obsessed by the example of billiard balls, you now have your answer. Hume 
was writing his Treatise in France in the 1730s, when the problem of knowing 
the causes of how one body acts on another during collisions was a high profile, 
much-discussed, unsolved problem at the foundations of physics. Hume’s fel-
low Edinburgh Scot from a generation before, John Keill, had argued that con-
stant conjunction is evidence of cause (Keill 1720: 90). He did so to argue from 
																																																						
22 For discussion of the 1724 competition and ensuing developments, see also Scott 1970, chs. 2 
and 3. Scott’s focus is on hard-body collisions, and he frames the debates in terms of atomism 
versus conserved quantity approaches to collisions. To our knowledge, this is the only other 
text to place collisions center stage. 
23 The broader challenge is to the criteria for any such account, and this theme is taken up by 




accepted cases of our knowledge of causation (such as collisions) to claims 
about causal knowledge of gravitational attraction. With the difficulties in 
providing an account of the causal process of collision becoming ever more ev-
ident, Hume turned that argument on its head. 
The same skeptical refrain—that impulsive action is unintelligible—comes 
from d’Alembert too, amplified for maximum resonance in the Encyclopedie:  
 
we do not know, and likely will never know, by what power this change (of motion 
in impact) is effected, and why a body that collides with another does not just come 
to rest after impact—without communicating some of its motion to the impacted 
body. (d’Alembert 1778: 932) 
 
Thus by the 1750s, the old wisdom that collision is eminently intelligible had 
gone bankrupt. 
The above two reasons are together sufficient for the problem to have been 
acute at the time. There is one more that shows the depth and gravity of what 
was at stake. It lurks in the background, rarely addressed explicitly, but a little 
reflection brings it readily to light. The problem of collisions, we claim, was a 
problem not just for physics (that is, for natural philosophy) but for philosophy 
much more generally. To see this, one need only note that among the bodies in 
the world are human bodies. To have an account of human bodily action, one 
must first have an account of bodily action generally. After all, if I am to use my 
hand to help you up from your chair, my body must act on yours; to turn on the 
light, I must move the switch.24 Any area of philosophy that presupposes human 
bodily action therefore depends on an account of bodily action, and so finds 
itself entangled with the problem of collisions. Descartes’s philosophy is a case 
in point. For Descartes, the embodied human being acts on other bodies in ac-
cordance with the laws of nature and the rules of collision, and one suggestion 
for how this might be so is this: while the laws and rules determine much about 
the outcome of collisions, they do not determine the direction of motion in 
many cases, and it is here that the human soul may intervene, selecting the di-
rection of motion, though having no bearing on the quantity of motion.25 Come 
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former are a subset of the latter. 
25 It is controversial whether this view can be attributed to Descartes himself. See Schmaltz 
2008, §4.3.3, and also Pitts, “The Mind-Body Problem and Conservation Laws: The Growth 




the 1730s, Du Châtelet worried about Leibniz’s principle of conservation of liv-
ing force and its implications for free human action. In her account of free will, 
two elements are required: a will governed by reason and the physical power to 
act: an account of how it is that one body can act on another is a prerequisite for 
an account of human action.  
This makes the problem of bodily action relevant not just for natural phi-
losophy but for moral and political philosophy too. In the early decades of the 
18th century, these disparate areas of philosophy shared a common conception 
of body, and this conception of body thereby played a unifying role. Physics 
was that branch of philosophy expected to provide all of philosophy with an 
account of body in general, including its nature, powers, properties, causes, ef-
fects, origins, attributes, modes, and so forth. This upshot is worth pausing over. 
Body-body action is not “merely” a foundational problem for 18th century nat-
ural philosophy, it is a problem with much wider ramifications and implications.  
Taken together, these three reasons—concerning intelligibility, intractabil-
ity and scope—enable us to see why such an apparently humdrum problem 
within the foundations of physics came to be painfully acute by the 1730s and 
40s.26 
 
5. Du Châtelet responds 
From her letters, and from the topics discussed in her 1740 Institutions de Phy-
sique (Foundations of Physics), it is clear that Du Châtelet sought an account of 
bodies and bodily action adequate for the purposes both of physics (or natural 
philosophy) and of philosophy more generally. Within this context, we can read 
her as responding to Maupertuis’ challenge to render bodily action intelligible, 
and her adoption of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) as her criterion of 
intelligibility. She deploys PSR in her examination of gravitation, thereby rul-
ing out attraction. She also uses PSR in developing her account of bodies and 
their forces, which she depends on in discussing contact action. Her account of 
collisions is the most developed attempt of the period to provide a causal ex-
planation of the process by which one body acts on another during the collision 
process, in terms of a theory of matter, and such that the rules of collision are 
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changing context in the 18th century, outlined in this section, that raises the visibility and sali-




integrated into that theory of matter. This makes its successes—and failures—
of particular interest. 
According to Du Châtelet, bodies arise from simple substances. These sim-
ples are not themselves extended, but have primitive active and passive force. 
Multiplicities of these simples give rise to bodies as we experience them. Such 
bodies have three essential properties: extension (shape and size); derivative 
passive force (by which they resist changes in motion); and derivative active 
force (which is the principle of change in bodies and the means by which they 
act on other bodies). This active force in turn manifests itself as either dead 
force (when a body’s motion is impeded by another body) or living force (“vis 
viva”) when a body is in motion. 
Du Châtelet offers a qualitative account of the collision process, which pro-
ceeds roughly as follows. Each body has a quantity of active force. When bodies 
press upon one another during a collision, active force manifests itself as dead 
force. Once the active force of one body is used up, it can no longer act on the 
other body but merely resist (through its passive force), and the remaining ac-
tive force of the other body now manifests itself as living force; the two bodies 
begin to move. This qualitative process is then connected up to quantitative 
results (including those associated with the rules of collision) by associating the 
Leibnizian conceptions of force described above with her revised versions of 
Newton’s three laws of motion. This is the most promising attempt at an inte-
grated, causal-explanatory account of collisions from the first half of the 18th 
century, yet it is riddled with problems. It is not clear that the qualitative ac-
count is conceptually coherent, and it is not clear that one can arrive at a quan-
titative account by connecting the Leibnizian notions of force with Newton’s 
three laws of motion, even in the revised form that Du Châtelet offers them, in 
a coherent way. Moreover, even if these hurdles are overcome, it is very difficult 
to see how to make the account consistent with actual experimental results 
whilst retaining its explanatory power.27 We will not dwell on the details here. 
Our point is simply to note that the best account available at the time faced 
considerable difficulties. With this situation in mind, we can turn our attention 
to an alternative path ahead. 
 
6. Philosophical Mechanics 
																																																						




Our discussion so far has focused on physics, as it was understood at the time: 
the study of bodies, including their nature, properties, powers, causes and ef-
fects. As we have noted, it was the job of physics to provide a general account 
of bodies, suitable for philosophy in general. Moreover, physics provided the 
bodies that served as the subject-matter of mechanics, in a sense that will be-
come clear in what follows. At the time, physics was distinct from mechanics. 
This can seem puzzling to those of us who use the labels “classical physics” and 
“classical mechanics” interchangeably, even when thinking of developments in 
the 18th century due to such figures as Euler, d’Alembert, and Lagrange. Nev-
ertheless, if we are following the story forwards in time, rather than looking 
backwards through our present-day spectacles, distinguish them we must.  
“Physics” was a term often used interchangeably with “natural philosophy” 
at the time. We have seen Musschenbroek’s description of the goals and sub-
ject-matter of physics, and this was then a widely shared conception of physics 
or natural philosophy. The term “mechanics”, on the other hand, had a multi-
tude of uses, from the science of machines to the various strands of “mechanical 
philosophy”, but here we use it with one particular connotation, in use at the 
time and broadly familiar from present-day usage. Specifically, we are inter-
ested in rational mechanics, the problems and methods of which (no matter the 
various labels at the time) fell within the domain of mathematics. Under the 
label of “rational mechanics” we include traditional problems in statics (such 
as the mathematical treatment of the lever), as well as the study and develop-
ment of new problems involving motion (such as the pendulum, brachisto-
chrone and bead-on-a-wire), using geometry and, increasingly, methods that in-
corporated the new mathematics of Leibniz and of Newton. While some people 
at the time, including some of the most influential figures of the period, were 
both philosophers and mathematicians, the two disciplines were distinct. They 
had distinct methods, distinct goals, and distinct domains of authority. Our use 
of the term “rational mechanics” is one that came to dominate by the end of the 
18th century, and it can be found explicitly one hundred years earlier in the 
Preface to Newton’s Principia.28  
																																																						
28 The first two books of Newton’s Principia consider motions and forces considered mathemat-
ically, and in the third book—where we consider the motions of the bodies in our planetary 
system—we proceed to physics. In “coming down” from rational mechanics to physics (New-
ton, 1999, p. 588), we first determine which forces are actual (i.e. which of the force laws ex-
plored by rational mechanics pertains in the behaviors of actual bodies), and then we seek the 
causes of these forces. For discussion of the role of mechanics in Newton’s Principia see Domski 




For Newton, rational mechanics and physics are both parts of natural phi-
losophy, but this choice of labels is confusing because the terms “physics” and 
“natural philosophy” were so often used interchangeably. To avoid this confu-
sion, we adopt the term “philosophical mechanics” to cover those projects, such 
as Newton’s Principia, which sought to combine rational mechanics with phys-
ics.29 The term captures the attempted unification and integration of results in 
rational mechanics, such as the rules of collision, with the goals and resources 
of physics (or natural philosophy), which at that time sought a matter theoretic 
causal understanding of the nature, properties, and behaviors of bodies.  
Physics and mechanics worked with a common subject-matter: bodies. 
However, it was physics that was authoritative as to the nature and properties 
of bodies, and so it was the philosopher who provided the account of bodies 
that were the subject-matter of mechanics. The mathematician, working in ra-
tional mechanics, abstracted from the properties of bodies treated by the phi-
losopher to consider only those relevant to the mathematical treatment of the 
motions of bodies. This allowed mechanics to simply presuppose the existence 
of the bodies that are its subject-matter, and from there develop largely inde-
pendently of physics (as, for example, in the work of Galileo). In philosophical 
mechanics, the attempted integration of physics and mechanics begins from this 
presumption of a shared subject-matter: the bodies that are the subject-matter 
of physics are also those studied in rational mechanics.  
Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy, Part II, in which he attempts to combine 
quantitative rules of collision with his theory of matter, is an example of philo-
sophical mechanics. The treatments of collisions we have mentioned so far, 
from Malebranche to Du Châtelet, are also examples of philosophical mechan-
ics. These approaches all have three things in common. First, they begin with 
the physics, and seek to recover, or otherwise arrive at, the mechanics from 
there: they are physics-led approaches to philosophical mechanics. Second, 
given the conception of physics at the time, it is from the theory of matter that 
such a physics takes its resources in constructing bodies. Finally, as we have 
seen, when it came to the problem of collisions, none succeeded.30  
																																																						
29 The term was first used (to our knowledge) in a French text on mechanics by Gaspard Prony 
(1799). In our book, Philosophical Mechanics in the Age of Reason, we adopt it for our own pur-
poses.  
30 Our point here dovetails with the general lessons that Mark Wilson has drawn about the elu-
sive ways in which rational-mechanical formalism and various pictures of matter become en-
tangled in “classical mechanics”. Our paper reinforces his lesson from a historical vantage 
point. Cf. his discussion of “Newtonian” accounts of collision, in Wilson (forthcoming). Some 




With the framework of philosophical mechanics in mind, an alternative pre-
sents itself: we might begin instead from rational mechanics, and hope for suc-
cess by this route. One person who proceeded in this way was Leonard Euler.  
 
7. Euler’s collision theory 
In 1736, Euler published his Mechanica in which he outlines a project of treating 
the motions of bodies, beginning with the motion of point particles and moving 
from there step-by-step through the treatment of extended bodies (both rigid 
and flexible) moving under constraints, to the treatment of collisions.  
That was his plan. In practice, however, the two published volumes of Me-
chanica concern solely the motion of point particles, and neither contains a 
treatment of collisions. This tells us something important: collisions are not 
foundational for Euler’s mechanics; their treatment is a complex problem to be 
arrived at through first solving simpler cases (the motions of point particles, free 
motions of extended bodies, constrained motions of extended bodies, etc.), and 
the rules of collision are to be recovered within this wider system of mechanics. 
Euler developed his theory of collisions in a series of papers in the 1740s 
and 50s. In his Mechanica, he had attributed a set of properties to bodies, as 
necessary for the solution of problems in mechanics: extension, inertia, and im-
penetrability. In his collision papers, his starting point is this set of properties. 
First, he argues from bodies as extended, inertial and impenetrable to a general 
condition on the rules of collision. As a rational mechanics, these results are 
limited, for they take as primitive properties of extended bodies (rigidity, elas-
ticity, and so forth) that Euler had yet to treat systematically in his mechanics. 
His goal was not primarily mechanics, but the integration of physics and me-
chanics: a philosophical mechanics. Euler’s next step is to argue that impene-
trability is the origin of the force that causes the change in a state of a body in 
collision. Moreover, Euler argued, having identified this cause we have met the 
demands of physics. In short, we begin from mechanics, which gives us the 
properties of bodies in general, and from there develop both the rules of colli-
sion and a physics of collisions. This is Euler’s solution to the problem of colli-
sions.  
The details of this proposal are not important for our present purposes.31 
What matters for our story is Euler’s understanding of the goals of physics, and 
																																																						




of the relationship of physics to rational mechanics. In an unpublished manu-
script from the 1750s, Natural Philosophy, Euler is explicit in his conception of 
natural philosophy. He writes: “Natural philosophy is a science that aims to ex-
plain the causes of changes that occur in bodies” (1862: 57; our translation). 
That natural philosophy has bodies as its subject-matter, and that it is con-
cerned with causes, aligns with the conception of physics (or natural philoso-
phy) offered by Musschenbroek. However, the emphasis on changes is a signif-
icant difference. Euler writes: 
 
Whoever can point to the reason why a change has occurred, has found its cause, 
and thus fulfils the ultimate aim of Natural Philosophy… 
This ultimate aim is focused only on changes...  (Euler 1862: 57; our translation) 
 
The upshot of this is that the aim of natural philosophy is to determine all and 
only those properties of bodies relevant to the changes that bodies undergo, and 
to give the causes of those changes. Since only extension, inertia, and impene-
trability are relevant for deriving the rules of collision, and since impenetrabil-
ity can be shown to be the cause of the changes bodies undergo as a result of 
collision, Euler’s account is sufficient to fulfil the aims of physics. Or so he 
claims. 
Euler’s justification for appealing to extension, inertia, and impenetrability 
in his account of bodily collision is rational mechanics: it is through the math-
ematical treatment of the motions of bodies that we discover the most general 
properties of bodies. Rather than physics providing rational mechanics with a 
general conception of bodies and their properties, for Euler it is the other way 
around: rational mechanics acts as a constraint on matter theory.32 In other 
words, it is the “mathematicians”, working in rational mechanics, who claim 
authority over the most general properties of bodies. That task had, until this 
time, lain in the domain of the philosophers, as the task of physics.  
In his paper on space and time (1750), Euler states his position unequivo-
cally. The principles of mechanics are so firmly established that their truth is 
not to be doubted. Moreover, these principles depend upon the nature of bodies, 
and so any philosophical claims about the nature of bodies must be consistent 
																																																						
32 Euler’s position is in fact more complicated, since he also endorsed an a priori method for 
arriving at the general properties of bodies. More work is needed on Euler’s epistemology and 




with the requirements arising from mechanics. Indeed, the principles of me-
chanics can serve as a guide to metaphysical reasoning. In Euler’s taxonomy, 
physics can still treat specific kinds of bodies, but rational mechanics—in treat-
ing the motions of bodies in general—has priority and authority over the gen-
eral properties of bodies. What we see happening here is best described as a 
territory grab, with far-reaching consequences. Instead of taking its subject-
matter from physics, mechanics now supplies its own subject-matter: body in 
general. More than that, mechanics supplies the general conception of body for 
the rest of natural philosophy, and indeed for philosophy more widely.33 
And this is where we see physics begin to slip out of the philosophers’ nest. 
For, insofar as physics is the science of bodies in general, including their natures, 
properties, causes and effects, it is no longer the philosophers but now the math-
ematicians who have authority over these issues. It is the mechanics of the 
mathematicians, rather than the matter theory of the philosophers, from which 
we are to determine the properties of bodies in general. Left to the philosophers 
is “special physics”, the treatment of specific kinds of bodies (though not for 
long, as the 19th century would show), and “metaphysics”, which studies that 
which is “common to all created beings” (assuming there is such a category be-
yond general body itself). The “mathematicians,” the practitioners of rational 
mechanics, expand their territory to include all legitimate questions pertaining 
to “body in general,” and thus steal physics (or at least “general physics”) away 
from philosophy. 
We can sum up as follows. Recall our definition of philosophical mechanics 
as providing a treatment of the behavior of bodies that unifies the goals of phys-
ics (through a causal account of the behavior of bodies in terms of their nature, 
properties, and so forth) with those of rational mechanics (providing a quanti-
tative treatment of those behaviors, and in particular their motions). In his the-
ory of collisions, Euler sought to provide a unified, causal-explanatory account 
of the collision process: he sought a philosophical mechanics of collisions. Im-
portantly for our story, his philosophical mechanics begins from mechanics. 
																																																						
33 In the space and time paper (1750), Euler states that his confidence in mechanics arises from 
strong quantitative empirical success: “the marvelous accord of all the conclusions that one 
obtains through calculation, with all the motions of bodies on earth both solid and fluid and 
even with the motion of celestial bodies, shall be sufficient to put their truth beyond doubt.” 
However, with the exception of celestial mechanics, rational mechanics in the 18th century de-
veloped with surprisingly little connection to quantitative empirical results, and the epistemic 




More importantly still, Euler’s ambitions for mechanics reach far beyond colli-
sions. It is not simply for the purposes of collisions that rational mechanics has 
priority: it is for the concept of body quite generally.  
In the context of 18th century philosophy, this is a bold ambition: we seek a 
single concept of body that will serve not just for “general physics” and me-
chanics, but also for “special physics”, and importantly also for the human 
body, accounts of embodied human action, and so forth. This concept of body 
should thereby provide a unifying, common subject-matter across philosophy. 
Could Euler’s rational mechanics supply a general concept of body adequate 
for the needs of philosophy?  
The answer is no. Not just Euler, but 18th century mathematicians as a 
whole, did not have a completed rational mechanics of extended bodies: arriv-
ing at such a thing was a work-in-progress.34 Indeed, collisions pose such a very 
difficult and complex problem that even incorporating the rules of collision into 
a systematic rational mechanics had yet to be achieved. We saw above that col-
lisions are not a foundational problem for rational mechanics, and that Euler’s 
treatment of collisions presupposes rigid bodies subject to highly idealized con-
ditions: arriving at these rigid bodies along with a more generalized treatment 
of collisions, from within a general theory of rational mechanics, is a formida-
bly complicated task whose solution existed only as a promissory note.  
Where does this leave us? The natural philosophers’ physics-first approach 
to philosophical mechanics had failed to provide a satisfactory theory of colli-
sions. The mathematicians’ mechanics-first approach, championed by Euler, 
stole authority over the general properties of bodies (“general physics”) from 
natural philosophy and placed it in the domain of mechanics. But, as of the late 
18th century, mechanics had failed to deliver a general account of body ade-
quate for the needs of philosophers. So what? 
 
8. So what for philosophy? So what for physics? 
Where did this leave philosophy? Looking back, it seems to us that there are 
four responses available to philosophers of the late 18th century. The first is for 
philosophers to shut up shop, go home, and wait for the new “science of bodies 
in general” to be completed, whenever that might be, before continuing. This 
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is hardly practical. The second is to proceed with caution, paying careful atten-
tion to the developments in the science. This is something Kant tried to do. Un-
fortunately for him, mechanics moved on ahead of him (Stan 2015), but the gen-
eral approach is one found among some philosophers of physics today. The 
third is to proceed in bolder fashion, making claims as to the autonomy of one’s 
philosophical project from the details of the whatever the “science of bodies in 
general” turns out to be. Philosophers nowadays are known to make such re-
marks as “Whatever physics turns out to say about the fundamental ontology of 
the world, dot dot dot”, and then make their claims, thus presuming both auton-
omy from the details and consistency with those details (not always success-
fully). And finally, philosophers might say, “so much the worse for physics in 
struggling to give an account of its own subject-matter”, and proceed to develop 
independent accounts of the subject-matter of different areas of philosophy, 
from the “specific physics” of special kinds of bodies, such as chemical bodies, 
and living bodies, to the human bodies of moral and political philosophy, and 
so forth, thereby fragmenting our concept of body. We can recognize this ap-
proach in philosophy today, too. 
What about physics? Whereas at the beginning of the 18th century, matter 
theory provided the resources from which the subject-matter of physics was 
constructed—bodies—by the late 18th century those resources were to come 
from mechanics. Insofar as mechanics is able to supply these resources (and the 
presumption of Euler’s project is that it could), then the ontology of the new 
physics is autonomous from philosophy. Moreover, when it comes to epistemol-
ogy, mathematicians sought warrant and justification for the results of mechan-
ics in the mathematical methods and the quantitative empirical successes of me-
chanics itself. In this way, physics flew the philosophers’ nest, achieving (or at 
least aspiring to) an autonomy in both its ontology and its epistemology. Eval-
uating the extent of the success is a project for philosophers of physics today. 
We have over-simplified the story, of course. On the one hand, attempts to 
integrate mechanics and matter theory recur throughout the nineteenth century 
and beyond. On the other hand, a great many other factors were at work. But 
we stand by our central claim: the failure of philosophers to solve the problem 
of collisions, as they understood it, played a pivotal role in driving physics and 
philosophy apart.  
At the outset we asked: What happened?—And, what philosophical lessons 
should we take away? If we look at the 18th century, and the rise of mechanics, 




philosophical difficulties, in comparison to celestial mechanics. It is true that 
the 18th century saw extraordinary successes in celestial mechanics, and that 
this gave great prestige to the “mathematicians” and the practitioners of rational 
mechanics, at the expense of the “philosophers.” However, throughout all of 
this the subject-matter of philosophy and celestial mechanics might have re-
mained one and the same, with physics (understood as a part of philosophy) 
providing the account of the bodies that are the subject-matter of celestial me-
chanics. In that case, while the physics of the philosophers and that of the math-
ematicians might have drifted apart due to social and political factors, philo-
sophically they would have remained unified by a shared subject-matter.  
The case of terrestrial mechanics is different. Here, we find philosophical 
reasons for the split. Faced with the long term and persistent failure of philoso-
phers to solve the problem of collisions, Euler re-conceptualized the aims of 
physics, and turned to rational mechanics for the resources necessary to pursue 
physics. This reconceptualization was successful for the purposes of mechanics 
and general physics, but unsuccessful more generally, for it failed to provide a 
general concept of body suitable for the purposes of philosophy. As a result, the 
subject-matter of philosophy was severed from that of the newly conceptual-
ized physics. It is this ontological dis-unification, we claim, that sits at the heart 
of the split between physics and philosophy. To go back to where we began: it 
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